tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22363645.post6733959040356867222..comments2021-04-20T04:35:44.650-07:00Comments on armchair investigations: Names or what?Brian Rabernhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05189164021937523325noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22363645.post-90821761399144299662008-10-24T11:38:00.000-07:002008-10-24T11:38:00.000-07:00In the second set of "modified name" examples, the...In the second set of "modified name" examples, there's a linguistic out where the adjectives act as appositives rather than restrictive modifiers. That is, using "the mighty Mississippi" serves two roles. One, it picks out the river using the name (though, of course, the definite signals it's halfway to a descriptive noun already). Two, it adds another statement that the river is "mighty".<BR/><BR/>Alternatively, the river might have two states, mighty and dormant, in which case, "mighty" looks like an adjective again. We can have names for states of objects as well as for objects; language as actually used by people to communicate is pretty flexible.<BR/><BR/>Having said that, treating names homogeneously as rigid designators has always seemed like a mistake to me, even when I was knee-deep in teaching Kripke. A pragmatic dismissal of the problem assumes they're all descriptions at some level created by cognitive agents without any priveleged direct link to extra-cognitive intensions.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22363645.post-12253945603923718462007-12-26T17:07:00.000-08:002007-12-26T17:07:00.000-08:00Sorry if I'm not being clear, and thanks for respo...Sorry if I'm not being clear, and thanks for responding, I apprieciate it! Here is a link:<BR/><BR/>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument<BR/><BR/>When refering to Plantiga's ontological proof, here is a rebuttal:<BR/><BR/>"The argument works by examining the concept of God, and arguing that it implies the actual existence of God; that is, if we can conceive of God, then God exists. However, this type of argument is often criticized as committing a bare assertion fallacy, meaning that it offers no outside premise to support its argument other than qualities inherent to the unproven statement."<BR/><BR/>I hope that clears up my question!<BR/><BR/>Also, what do you think of the S5 axiom?<BR/><BR/> * Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p<BR/> * Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p<BR/><BR/>I am thoroughly facinated with modal logic, and I would really enjoy learning more about it!Joe Aranthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12268752737559014549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22363645.post-81386722766827456442007-12-26T14:28:00.000-08:002007-12-26T14:28:00.000-08:00certain axioms are assumed and an assumption is as...certain axioms are assumed and an assumption is assumed but I am not sure what this "bare assertion" deal is.Brian Rabernhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05189164021937523325noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22363645.post-12430491675645110262007-12-26T13:00:00.000-08:002007-12-26T13:00:00.000-08:00Hello, my name is Joe, and I had a quick question ...Hello, my name is Joe, and I had a quick question for you concerning the following post:<BR/><BR/>http://www.uweb.ucsb.edu/~rabern/A%20Modal%20Ontological%20Argument%20for%20God.pdf<BR/><BR/>The question is: Does this argument commit the bare assertion fallacy? (The bare assertion fallacy is fallacy in formal logic where a premise in an argument is assumed to be true merely because it says that it is true). I am under the impression that it doesn't, but an aquaintance seems to think it does. :)<BR/><BR/>Peace.Joe Aranthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12268752737559014549noreply@blogger.com